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Case No. 20150832-CA 
INTHE 
UT AH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
V. 
CHANCE ARIC NAVARRO, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions on two counts of possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a resh·icted person, third degree felonies, and 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. This Court has 
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2015). 
INTRODUCTION 
Officers stopped Defendant's car because its windows appeared to be 
illegally tinted and because they believed that Defendant was a felon 
illegally possessing a weapon. Defendant concedes that the stop was lawful 
based on the windows tint. But Defendant contends that the officers did not 
0 diligently pursue" a course of action that was likely to dispel or confirm 
the purposes of the stop. He alleges that the officers delayed processing the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
stop to have a drug dog sniff the car and claims that the h·ial court erred in 
denying his motion to suppress evidence they found. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Did the officers' stop and subsequent search of Defendant's car 
violate his Fourth Amendment rights? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision on a motion to suppress 
evidence for an alleged Fourth Amendment violation is a mixed question of 
law and fact. State v. Fuller, 2014 UT 29, if 17, 332 P.3d 937. The court's 
underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Id. The court's 
legal conclusions are reviewed non-deferentially for correctness, including 
its application of the legal standard to the facts. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provision and statute are reproduced in 
the Addendum: 
U.S. Const. amend. IV; 
Utah Code Ann. §41-62-1635 (West Supp. 2013). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS 
A. Summary of Facts. 
On the night of August 1, 2013, members of the Washington County 
drug task force were surveilling a tire store located in an industrial park in 
-2- . 
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St. George. R141, 1.71. They were looking for Travis Farnsworth for whom 
they had obtained an arrest warrant. R141. The task force did not find 
Farnsworth that night but witnessed illegal drug activity. R171-76. 
While the task force was looking for Farnsworth, a woman showed 
up at the business driving a van registered to Daniel Cooney, who was 
working in the store. R145-46. Detective Jason Jarvey saw Defendant arrive 
at the store in a green Tahoe SUV. R139, 146; see also R208. 
At about 10:55 p.m., Sergeant Jared Parry saw Cooney inside the 
store, putting a white pipe to his mouth, smoking, and exhaling white-
colored smoke. R150. Based on his experience, Parry believed that Cooney 
was smoking illegal drugs. RlSl. 
Parry then saw Defendant walk out of the tire store, place a backpack 
in the passenger side of the Tahoe, and return to the store. R146, 151-52. At 
that point, Parry was able to identify him. Id. Parry knew Defendant from a 
criminal case several years earlier- he knew that Defendant had pleaded 
guilty to some felony charges in exchange for the State's dropping charges 
against his wife. R157. The case involved "a decent amount of marijuana as 
well as a handgun." R158. Based on the case, Parry believed that 
Defendant was prohibited from possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. 
Id. Parry also knew that two known confidential informants had reported 
-3-
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that Defendant "had guns, and that if he was stopped by police he was 
going to shoot it out with the police." R159. 1 
While watching Defendant, Sergeant Parry noticed that the tint on the 
Tahoe's windows was extremely dark. R152. Based on his experience, he 
was "very confident" that the tint was too dark to be legal. R154. Parry also 
observed Defendant scanning the area around the store with binoculars. 
R155-56. At some point, Defendant went back outside and opened the 
Tahoe's hatchback. R156. When he did so, Parry saw an object that, based 
on its shape, appeared to be a rifle case. R157. 
At 11:39 p.m., Defendant drove away in his green Tahoe. R161-62. 
Four other vehicles followed, creating "a little convoy." Id. Parry believed 
at this point that there was reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant: the 
window tint was too dark and it appeared that Defendant was a felon 
illegally possessing a gun. R179-80. Parry advised the other task force 
members via radio of the tint violation and urged officers to use caution 
with Defendant because he had a gun case in his car and could be 
dangerous. R163, 209, 238-39. 
1 This information had come to Parry through other investigators, but 
he personally knew and could contact the informants who had made the 
allegation. R160. 
-4-
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Task force members Jim Jessop and Nick Nuccitelli2 watched the 
convoy travel to a Wendy's, where one car drove through the drive-up 
service lane before rejoining the others. R212. They then watched 
Defendant's car and a black car move on to a nearby Denny's parking lot. 
R213. Officer Jessop confirmed that Defendant's windows "appeared to be 
way too dark," that they were "[n]ot even borderline." R213, 214. Officers 
Jessop and Nuccitelli turned into the Denny's lot and, at approximately 
11:45 p.m., activated their overhead lights to stop both vehicles. R164, 214-
15. 
A woman exited the black passenger car and walked quickly towards 
Denny's, but the officers ordered her to the ground. R215. After the woman 
complied, the officers turned their attention to Defendant's car- one officer 
approached the driver's side and the other officer approached the 
passenger's side. R216. The officers ordered Defendant to show them his 
hands. Id. He was slow to comply, but eventually showed them both 
hands. R217. Officers Jessop and Nuccitelli then opened the Tahoe's door, 
got Defendant out, and frisked him. R218. When they discovered a knife 
with a four-to-five-inch fixed blade near Defendant's front belt pocket, the 
2 The motion-to-suppress transcript spells the name as Nutchatelli. 
See R238. But the officer signed the probable cause statement with 
Nuccitelli. See R4. The State therefore uses that spelling. 
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officers handcuffed him and began talking to him about the tint violation. 
R218-20. 
Sergeant Parry arrived at the Denny's lot while Detective Jessop was 
talking with Defendant, and he too talked with Defendant about the tint 
violation. R165. None of the officers had a tint meter, so they requested 
one. R166. And at 12:03 a.m., Sergeant Parry called for a drug dog, which 
was "within blocks" of the Denny's. R168-69. Another officer ran 
Defendant's criminal history on his computer and learned that Defendant 
was not a felon. R201-02.3 Shortly after, the canine officer arrived at the 
scene and deployed his drug dog. R169, 233, 255. The dog alerted on the 
car. R170-71. Sometime after that, another officer arrived with the tint 
meter. R233, 255. 
At 12:12 a.m., officers searched Defendant's car. R170-71. They found 
an AK-47 and a Tek-9 with ammunition in reach of the driver. R3. Inside 
the center console, they found a pipe with white residue along with a baggie 
of suspected methamphetamine. Id. Defendant later admitted to having 
3 Sergeant Parry later discovered why Defendant was not a felon: at 
some point, a reduction had been entered in Defendant's felony case. R202. 
-6-
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smoked methamphetamine earlier 1n the day and also to owning the 
firearms inside the Tahoe.4 R4. 
B. Summary of Proceedings. 
Defendant was charged with two counts of illegally possessing a 
dangerous weapon, third degree felonies; possessing methamphetamine, a 
third degree felony; possessing drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor; 
and operating a vehicle with illegally tinted windows, a class C 
misdemeanor. Rl-2. After bindover, Defendant moved to suppress the 
evidence found in the search. R19. The h·ial court held an evidentiary 
hearing and took argument on the motion. R28; R137-279. In its oral 
findings, the trial court found that "a tint n1eter was requested," that "it 
arrived probably in the neighborhood of 20 minutes after the stop," and that 
"the drug dog arrived in the neighborhood of probably 10 or 15 minutes 
after the stop" and "prior to the time the tint meter got there." R258. The 
court relied on the testimony of two officers that the meter "clearly arrived 
after the drug dog arrived there and after the sniff had been done." R260. 
There was "[n]o evidence to the contrary." Id. In its written findings, the 
trial court further found that "both a tint meter and a K-9 unit were 
4 Because Defendant has not included a copy of the trial transcript on 
appeal, the State cites here to the probable cause statement. 
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requested shortly after the stop, and that the tint meter did not arrive until 
after the arrival of the K-9 unit." R59. 
Based on these findings, the court ruled that "[o]nce the K-9 alerted 
on the defendant's vehicle, the detectives had reasonable suspicion of 
additional serious criminal activity, and could appropriately expand the 
investigative scope of the initial stop." Id. The court denied the motion to 
suppress, concluding that II the detectives did not act unconstitutionally in 
the initial detention of defendant for an equipment violation, nor did they 
act unconstitutionally in the expanded investigation of defendant for 
additional serious criminal activity." R60 
Defendant was tried and convicted of two counts of possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person (unlawful user of a controlled 
substance) and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. R129. The 
trial court sentenced Defendant to two prison terms of up to five years on 
the weapons counts and to a six-month jail term on the paraphernalia count. 
R129. The court ordered that the terms be served concurrently. Id. The 
Court stayed execution of the sentence and placed Defendant on probation 
for 36 months. R130. Defendant tiinely appealed. R133. 
-8-
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The officers' stop did not violate Defendant's Fourth Amendment 
rights. Defendant concedes that the stop was lawful at its inception based 
on reasonable suspicion that his windows were illegally tinted. But the stop 
was also lawful at its inception based on an officer's observation of the rifle-
shaped case in Defendant's car and his knowledge that Defendant had been 
convicted of a felony, making it illegal to possess a weapon. 
The stop was also executed in a reasonable manner. The officers 
"diligently pursued" the purposes of the stop. The officers conducted a 
criminal history check, which dispelled their suspicion that he was a felon 
in possession of a weapon. They also requested a tint meter and, upon its 
arrival, confirmed their suspicion of the tint violation. The drug dog 
request, deployment, and alert was made in the interim and thus did not 
extend the length of the detention. The evidence supports the trial court's 
findings that the officers requested the tint meter and K-9 unit shortly after 
the stop was made and that the dog arrived and alerted before the tint 
meter arrived. Defendant contends that the officers should have first 
contacted dispatch about the stop and requested the driver license, 
registration, and proof of insurance. Al though such requests are 
-9-
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appropriate, officers are not required to make those inquiries or make them 
before investigating the suspected traffic or criminal offenses. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRAFFIC STOP WAS LAWFUL AT ITS INCEPTION 
AND EXECUTED IN A REASONABLE MANNER 
A traffic or investigatory stop must meet two basic Fourth 
Amendment require1nents. First, the stop must be "lawful at its inception," 
and second, the stop must be "executed in a reasonable manner.'' Illinois v. 
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405,408 (2005). 
The stop here was "lawful at its inception." After officers saw the 
illegally-dark window tint on Defendant's Tahoe, they had reasonable 
suspicion to stop him for an equipment violation. In addition, one of the 
officers knew Defendant, who had pleaded guilty in a felony case a few 
years earlier. When the officer saw Defendant lift the hatch of the car to 
expose what appeared to be a rifle case, he had reasonable suspicion to stop 
Defendant for illegally possessing a weapon. Thus, as the trial court ruled, 
the stop was justified at its inception. 
Moreover, as the trial court also ruled, the officers diligently pursued 
the purposes of the stop. They ran a criminal history check to verify 
Defendant's status as a felon and requested a tint meter to determine 
whether Defendant's windshield complied with the tint laws. Thus, the stop 
-10-
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was executed in a reasonable manner. The drug dog request, deployment, 
and alert were made in the interim and did not extend the length of the 
stop. 
A. The stop was justified at its inception. 
A traffic or investigatory stop "for a suspected violation of the law is 
a 'seizure' of the occupants of the vehicle and therefore must be conducted 
in accordance with the Fourth Amendment." Heien v. North Carolina, 135 
S.Ct. 530, 536 (2014) (citing Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255-59 (2007)). 
To justify this type of seizure, "officers need only 'reasonable suspicion' -
that is, 'a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular 
person stopped' of breaking the law." Id. (quoting Navarette v. California, 
134 S.Ct. 1683, 1687-88 (2014) (additional internal quotation omitted)). 
This is true whether or not the officers are motivated by some other 
purposes in making the stop. In Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), 
the Supreme Court held that the temporary detention of a motorist upon 
probable cause to believe that he has violated the traffic laws does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment, even if a reasonable officer would not have 
stopped the motorist absent some additional objective. In so holding, the 
Court reasoned that its case law "foreclose[ s] any argument that the 
constitutional reasonableness of h·affic stops depends on the actual 
-11-
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motivations of the individual officers involved." Id. 813. "Subjective 
intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment 
analysis." Id. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also held that if "reasonable in scope, a 
traffic stop based on probable cause or reasonable suspicion that the driver 
has violated any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment 
regulations, is lawful under the Fourth Amendment." State v. Lopez, 873 
P.2d 1127, 1140 (Utah 1994), (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 
(1979) (internal quotation omitted)). It is "irrelevant what else the officer 
knew or suspected about the h·affic violator at the tin1e of the stop." Id. 
1. As Defendant concedes, the stop was justified at its 
inception based on the officers' observations of the illegal 
window tint. 
Defendant concedes that the stop was justified at its inception based 
on the officers' observation of the window tint. See Br.Aplt. 12-13; State v. 
Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (holding that an observed traffic 
violation justifies stop). He further concedes that the officers' subjective 
motives for initiating the stop are irrelevant. Br.Aplt. 12-13. 
-12-
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2. The stop was also justified at its inception based on an 
officer's observation of a gun case in Defendant's car and 
the officer's knowledge that Defendant had pleaded 
guilty to a felony. 
Moreover, and contrary to Defendant's claim otherwise, Br.Aplt. 22, 
the facts known to Officer Parry also supported reasonable suspicion that 
Defendant was a felon in possession of a firearm and therefore in violation 
of the law. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(1)(b)(i) & (3)(a) (West 2015) 
(making it a third degree felony for a felon to possess a firearm). That night, 
Officer Parry had seen what appeared, based on its shape, to be a rifle case 
in Defendant's car. R157. Parry had been directly involved in a criminal 
case a few years earlier where Defendant pleaded guilty to felony charges. 
Id. These matters supported a reasonable suspicion that Defendant was a 
felon and therefore illegally possessing a dangerous weapon. 
B. The ensuing detention was executed in a reasonable manner. 
To comport with the Fourth Amendment, a stop justified at its 
inception must also be executed in a reasonable manner. Cabelles, 543 U.S. 
at 408. A stop is reasonable in its execution so long as the officer "diligently 
pursue[s]" a course of action that is likely to fulfill the purpose of the stop. 
See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). The police must end the 
stop and release the vehicle's occupants "when [they] have no further need 
to control the scene." Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009). This 
-13-
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normally occurs once the initial purpose of the stop is concluded. State v. 
Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ,I31, 63 P.3d 650. But officers are allowed '0 to 
graduate their responses to the demands of [the] particular situation."' 
Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686 (citation omitted). Accordingly, if during the scope of 
a stop, an "officer forms new reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal 
activity, the officer may also expediently investigate his new suspicion." 
State v. Baker, 2010 UT 18, if 13, 229 P.3d 650. 
Defendant contends that the ensuing detention was not executed in a 
reasonable manner. See Br.Aplt. 14-21. He is wrong. The officers here 
"diligently pursued" a course of action that was likely to fulfill the purposes 
of the stop-first, to determine whether the Tahoe had illegally tinted 
windows and, second, to determine whether Defendant had violated the 
law prohibiting felons from possessing weapons. 
Defendant contends that the officers impermissibly exploited the 
traffic stop because the officers did not advise the dispatcher that they had 
initiated the stop and because they did not ask Defendant to produce his 
driver license, vehicle registration, or proof of insurance. Br.Aplt. 16. He 
argues that the stop did not "resemble a h·affic stop"; that the officers 
unreasonably waited 18 minutes to request a tint meter and did not request 
the tint meter before they called for the K-9 unit; and that the officers 
-14-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
unreasonably spent time runnmg Defendant's criminal history in an 
attempt to detennine if he was a convicted felon. Id. 19. Defendant cannot 
prevail on any of these claims. 
1. The officers executed the stop in a reasonable manner: 
not contacting dispatch and not asking Defendant to 
produce his driver license, vehicle registration, or proof of 
insurance did not expand the scope of the stop. 
Defendant first claims that the officers impermissibly exploited the 
stop because they did not contact dispatch to alert dispatch that they had 
stopped Defendant and because they did not ask Defendant to produce his 
driver license, vehicle registration, or proof of insurance. Id. 16. Defendant 
has set forth no law requiring officers to take those measures. He has set 
forth no law suggesting that absent such measures, the execution of the stop 
is unreasonable. Defendant simply claims, again without citing legal 
authority, that "if police are going to be able to conduct pretext stops," their 
encounters "must, on some level, resemble ... h·affic stop[s]." Id. 17. 
But, as explained, under controlling precedent, a stop is reasonable in 
its execution so long as the officer "diligently pursue[s]" a course of action 
that is likely to fulfill the purpose of the stop. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 
U.S. 675, 686 (1985). Here, officers stopped Defendant because they 
believed his windows were tinted too darkly and because they believed he 
was a felon in possession of a dangerous weapon. In the course of such a 
-15-
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stop, officers certainly "'may request a driver's license and vehicle 
registration.'" State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, if 31, 63 P.3d 650 (quoting Lopez, 
873 P.2d at 1132). But they are not required to do so. Nor are they required 
to conduct their investigation in any particular order. See State v. Baker, 2010 
UT 18, ~17, 229 P.3d 650 (holding that courts "should not micromanage the 
details of a traffic stop"). Immediately calling dispatch or requesting 
Defendant's driver license, vehicle registration, or insurance information 
would not confirm or dispel the officers' suspicions about the tint violation 
or Defendant's status as a felon. To detennine whether the Tahoe had a tint 
violation, the officers needed to get an objective measure of the window's 
transparency. And to determine whether Defendant was a felon, they 
needed to get his criminal history. Thus, seeking a tint meter and checking 
Defendant's criminal history did not unlawfully exploit the stop. Rather, 
these actions were directly related to the purpose of the stop. 
2. The officers diligently pursued the purposes of the stop. 
Sergeant Parry testified that Defendant's car and the other vehicles in 
his "convoy" left the tire shop at 11:39 p.m. The convoy first traveled to 
Wendy's and one car went through the drive-up lane. R212. After that car 
rejoined the convoy, all of the cars left the Wendy's. Id. Defendant's car 
-16-
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and a black passenger car proceeded into a Denny's parking lot, where 
officers stopped them. R213. 
After stopping Defendant at approximately 11:45 p.m., the officers 
did not merely wait for the drug dog, as Defendant suggests. They did a 
number of things in furtherance of the purpose of the stop. First, Detective 
Jessop and Officer Nuccitelli took the necessary safety precautions to 
protect themselves. See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015) 
(holding that "tolerable duration" of a stop includes time needed to "attend 
to related safety concerns"). Upon making the stop, the woman in the black 
car tried to leave the scene and the officers ordered her to the ground. R215. 
This was entirely appropriate. They needed to be able to focus on 
Defendant without having to worry about her. See Brendlin v. California, 551 
U.S. 249, 258 (2007) (holding that it is reasonable for officers "not [to] let 
people move around in ways that could jeopardize [officer] safety"). They 
also knew that Defendant had threatened to shoot any officer who stopped 
him and were aware of a rifle-shaped case in his car. Id. 
Thus, they took reasonable measures to protect the1nselves from 
Defendant. After securing the woman, the officers approached Defendant's 
car, asked him to show his hands, conducted a weapons frisk, and disarmed 
him. R216-20. These measures were necessary to enable the officers to 
-17-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pursue the purpose of the stop. They could only proceed with investigating 
the tinted windows and the firearm possession after they had taken the 
steps necessary to protect themselves. 
Once protected, the officers directed their activity toward confirming 
or dispelling their beliefs about Defendant's violations. An officer with a 
computer responded to the scene and officers thereafter checked 
Defendant's criminal history to see if he was a felon, found out that he was 
not, and thereby dispelled their suspicion that he was a felon illegally 
possessing a weapon. They also requested a tint meter-which Sergeant 
Parry had begun arranging for before the stop. See R59; R240. The officers 
could not confirm or dispel their suspicions about the windows until the 
meter arrived. In the interim, the officers requested a drug dog and the dog 
alerted on the car. See R168. That was all accomplished as they waited for 
the tint meter. Because the drug dog request, deployment, and alert did not 
prolong the stop, it did not violate Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. 
See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408 (holding that dog sniff does "not change the 
character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise 
executed in a reasonable manner"). 
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3. The evidence supports the trial court's finding that the 
tint meter and K-9 unit were both requested shortly after 
the stop was made. 
The trial court found that "both the tint meter and a K-9 unit were 
requested shortly after the stop." R59. Defendant claims that the finding is 
not supported by the evidence. Br.Aplt. 18. Defendant is wrong. 
In finding that the meter and K-9 unit were requested shortly after the 
stop, the court relied on the officers' testimony. Officer Nuccitelli testified 
that he was told before they stopped Defendant that Sergeant Parry was 
arranging for the tint meter. R240. And Officer Parry testified upon hearing 
that Detective Jessop and Officer Nuccitelli had stopped Defendant, he 
drove the few blocks to the Denny's parking lot, where he talked with 
Defendant about the tint violation. R165. Because none of the officers had a 
meter, someone requested one. R166. While Parry did not reme1nber with 
certainty who made the call, he testified that he likely did. R166. 
The court's finding that Officer Parry requested a drug dog a short 
time after the stop was 1nade is also supported by the testimony of the 
officers. Sergeant Parry testified that he requested the dog at 12:03 a.m. 
R168. That was about twenty minutes after the convoy left tire store, after 
the convoy h·aveled to Wendy's and after one of the cars had gone through 
the drive-up lane. See R212. And it was after Defendant's car and the black 
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passenger car had traveled to the Denny's parking lot; the woman driving 
the black car was secured; and Defendant was ordered out of the car, 
frisked, disarmed, and handcuffed. R213-15. Thus, while the call for the 
drug dog may have occurred briefly after the call for the tint meter, the trial 
court could reasonably have found that both calls were made "shortly after" 
the stop. 
Based on the testimony given, the trial court knew that Sergeant Parry 
was part of a group of officers working together on this matter. R168. He 
was at most a few blocks away from the Denny's when Defendant was 
stopped. R168. He had already begun arranging for a tint meter to arrive. 
R240. It is not clear whether or not he located one before he traveled to the 
site. But upon driving the few blocks to the stop scene, he talked with 
Defendant about the tint violation, checked to see if anyone there had a 
meter, and finding that no one did, either personally requested one or had 
one of his officers do so. R165-66. Under these circumstances, the trial court 
could reasonably have determined that this happened shortly after the stop 
was made. 
4. The K-9 unit was called and arrived on the scene before 
the tint meter arrived. 
Defendant claims that Sergeant Parry's testimony suggests that the 
tint meter arrived at the scene before the K-9 unit was summoned. Br.Aplt. 
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16. This claim arises from Defendant's misunderstanding of the testimony 
given. 
Sergeant Parry testified that he called for the K-9 unit at 12:03 a.m. 
R168. He also testified that the Detective Schuman arrived with the dog 
shortly after Parry called and sometime before 12:12 a.m. R169. The drug 
dog alerted on Defendant's car, and the officers began searchmg the car at 
12:12 a.m. R170-71. 
Detective Jessop testified that the meter arrived after the dog. R233. 
Officer Nuccitelli testified that the drug dog arrived in less than 15 minutes 
from the time Defendant was stopped. R233. He testified that the meter 
arrived about 20 minutes after the stop. R235. Putting this together, the 
court found, based on the testimony of Jessop and Nuccitelli, that the meter 
clearly arrived after the dog arrived. R124. 
All this supports a finding that the dog arrived and sniffed 
Defendant's car sometime after 12:03 a.m., and the meter arrived somewhat 
later. 
Defendant argues to the contrary, that Sergeant Parry testified that 
the tint meter arrived "[s]ometime before midnight twelve." Br.Aplt. 16 
(citing Parry's testimony at R137:69 [R205]). He claims that in so testifying, 
Parry testified that the tint meter arrived sometime before midnight and 
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thus at least three minutes before officers called for the K-9. But, as his 
other testimony shows, when Parry testified that the meter arrived 
sometime before ''midnight twelve," he did not mean that it arrived 
sometime before midnight. Rather he meant that it arrived sometime before 
12:12 a.m. 
Thus, Defendant's claim that Parry suggested that the tint meter 
arrived on the scene three minutes or more before the dog sniff is simply a 
misreading. "Midnight twelve" does not mean "midnight.'' 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the record supports the trial court's findings about what 
happened that night. The record does not show that the officers failed to 
diligently pursue the purposes of the stop or that the dog arrived and 
sniffed the drugs after the purposes of the stop had been completed. For the 
foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm the trial court's denial of the 
motion to suppress. 
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Respectfully submitted on July 5, 2016. 
SEAN D. REYES 
Utah Attorney General 
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U.S. CONST. amend. IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized. 
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§ 41-Ga-1635. Windshields and ... , U.C.A. 1953 § ... (Supp. 2013) 
I West's Utah Code Annotated 
!Title 41. Motor Vehicles 
I Chapter 6A. Traffic Code (Refs & Annos) 
I Part 16. Vehicle Equipment 
U.C.A. 1953 § 41-6a-1635 
§ 41-6a-1635. Windshields and windows--Tinting--Obstructions reducing visibility--Wipers--Prohibitions 
Currentness 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), a person may not operate a motor vehicle with: 
(a) a windshield that allows less than 70% light transmittance; 
(b) a front side window that allows less than 43% light transmittance; 
(c) any windshield or window that is composed of, covered by, or treated with any material or component that presents a 
metallic or mirrored appearance; or 
(d) any sign, poster, or other nontransparent material on the windshield or side windows of the motor vehicle except: 
(i) a certificate or other paper required to be so displayed by law; or 
(ii) the vehicle's identification number displayed or etched in accordance with rules made by the department under 
Section 4 l -6a-l601. 
(2) Nontransparent materials may be used: 
(a) along the top edge of the windshield if the materials do not extend downward more than four inches from the top edge 
of the windshield or beyond the AS- I line whichever is lowest; 
',':!ESTlt'i\\' © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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§ 41-Ga-1635. Windshields and ... , U.C.A. 1953 § ... (Supp. 2013) 
(b) in the lower left-hand corner of the windshield provided they do not extend more than three inches to the right of the 
left edge or more than four inches above the bottom edge of the windshield; or ~ 
(c) on the rear windows including rear side windows located behind the vehicle operator. 
(3) A windshield or other window is considered to comply with the requirements of Subsection (1) if the windshield or other 
window meets the federal statutes and regulations for motor vehicle window composition, covering, light transmittance, and 
treatment. 
(4) Except for material used on the windshield in compliance with Subsections (2)(a) and (b), a motor vehicle with tinting or 
nontransparent material on any window shall be equipped with rear-view mirrors mounted on the left side and on the right 
side of the motor vehicle to reflect to the driver a view of the highway to the rear of the motor vehicle. 
(5)(a)(i) The windshield on a motor vehicle shall be equipped with a device for cleaning rain, snow, or other moisture from 
the windshield. 
(ii) The device shall be constructed to be operated by the operator of the motor vehicle. 
(b) A windshield wiper on a motor vehicle shall be maintained in good working order. 
(6) A person may not have for sale, sell, offer for sale, install, cover, or treat a windshield or window in violation of this 
section. 
(7) Notwithstanding this section, any person subject to the federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, including motor vehicle 
manufacturers, distributors, dealers, importers, and repair businesses, shall comply with the federal standards on motor 
vehicle window tinting. 
Credits 
Laws 2005, c. 2, § 209, eff. Feb. 2, 2005; Laws 2005, c. 26, § 5, eff. May 2, 2005. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2005, c. 26 added "including rear side windows located behind the vehicle operator" in subsec. (2)(c). 
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